Accrued Interest

Accrued Interest

Nintendo Is Not the Apple of Video Games

Attach rates, the installed base ceiling, and the PC gaming migration all say what the stock price doesn't: this hardware company does not deserve a software multiple.

Accrued Interest (Simeon M.)'s avatar
Accrued Interest (Simeon M.)
Jul 22, 2026
∙ Paid

Accrued Interest TLDR: Nintendo’s ADR (Ticker: NTDOY) sits at $11, down roughly 56% from its 52-week high of $24.92, yet Wall Street still rates it with 17 Buys, 7 Holds and only 2 Sells. I think consensus is getting Nintendo very wrong. The new Switch 2 console is simply not selling enough games to keep the ecosystem healthy. Its organic software attach rate, once you adjust for the Mario Kart World bundles that Nintendo books as hardware sales, is 1.82, roughly half the original Switch’s 3.57. The gaming industry is migrating to PC and $30-$50 games, while Nintendo pushes game prices to $80 and raised the Switch to $500 before its 1 year anniversary. Switch 2’s lifetime ceiling is trending far below the 155 million Switch 1 installed base. Trading at roughly 21x forward earnings, Nintendo’s valuation is on par with Microsoft and higher than Sony, which makes no sense. If you own Nintendo and have been tempted to buy the dip, I am here to tell you the difficult truths the sell-side won’t. Let me explain why I expect Nintendo stock to Underperform the S&P 500 over the next 12 to 18 months.

Share


0. Introduction

This article is for everyone out there who has been wondering how Nintendo’s beloved brand is arguably bigger than ever before, but its stock has been a dud, massively trailing the S&P 500 for years at a time.

Here’s the setup. Twenty-six analysts cover Nintendo and the average price target clusters around ¥10,200-10,800 vs. the current Tokyo price near ¥7,000, implying Wall St. analysts think the stock is 45% to 55% undervalued. The bulls’ argument is essentially that this time is different for Nintendo. They claim that the Switch 2’s backward compatibility will help grow its installed user base. Bulls say the NSO (Nintendo Switch Online) system makes customers sticky, and the digital mix makes revenue recurring. Some substack writers claim Nintendo has built a walled garden that works like Apple’s: proprietary hardware, tightly integrated software, and fierce brand loyalty that locks users in. If true, then Nintendo has finally graduated from a cyclical hardware company into a platform that deserves a software multiple.

Let me be clear: no, this time is not different. Any time someone compares a company to Apple, one of the most dominant businesses in human history, my first instinct is to be skeptical. The company’s fiscal 2026 results, released this May, reveal the structural reality: Nintendo is a cyclical hardware company whose software economics are weaker than launch headlines imply. The erosion of the organic attach rate, management’s down-year guidance, and the broader industry shift toward a platform and price tier where Nintendo does not compete are all documented facts.

I am not calling for the stock to crash. Nintendo stock already fell more than 50% from its August 2025 high of $24.92, and the multiple has compressed from an absurd ~42x trailing at the peak of the hype to roughly 21x forward today (20.6x precisely; I’ll round to 21x).

But Nintendo’s current P/E multiple remains at a premium relative to its historical average and its closest industry peer, yet there is no apparent catalyst to trigger an upward re-rating. This deep dive will explain why the stock is unlikely to return to its recent high-water marks in the near future. The real issue is that the core bull narrative has structural cracks that overly optimistic investors are choosing to overlook, with their attention buried deep in their Super Mario Galaxy popcorn buckets.


1. Giving the bulls their due

Before I take the bull case apart, some intellectual honesty. Here’s what has gone right:

By unit volume, the Switch 2 achieved the most successful console launch in history, proving that Nintendo can still generate massive global demand. Moving 19.86 million consoles in just ten months, the system eclipsed the PS5’s comparable launch window. Eager buyers generated such intense demand that Nintendo spent a large portion of the year apologizing for inventory shortages.

Fiscal 2026 revenue witnessed a near-doubling. Net sales reached ¥2,313.1 billion, representing a 98.6% increase, while net income climbed 52.1% to ¥424.1 billion. In a genuine shift in capital allocation, the company uncharacteristically accelerated buybacks to roughly ¥100 billion from virtually zero and raised its dividend twice to finish the year at 219 yen.

Nintendo has a robust content pipeline. Fueled by a 40th-anniversary campaign, the Super Mario Galaxy film dominated the box office earlier this year. Meanwhile, the Star Fox remake nearly doubled its predecessor’s UK opening. Pokopia sold 2.2 million copies in four days, and Pokémon Winds and Waves is slated for 2027.

Management has a history of sandbagging, and then beating their earnings guidance. Nintendo’s initial FY2026 guidance was exceeded by 22% on revenue, 12.5% on operating profit, and 32% on Switch 2 hardware units. Bulls believe the FY2027 guidance is just the latest lowball, with Bloomberg reporting in May that internal hardware targets are roughly 20% higher than the public outlook.

In a vacuum, the above news is great but it ignores the core bear case. Post-launch excitement masks the fundamental issue: worsening unit economics for each console sold. Despite financial reports framing it strictly as a hardware company, the market continues to value it at a lofty software multiple. Let’s break down the data.


2. The attach rate has collapsed, and the bundle is hiding it

The single most important metric in the console business is one most bullish Nintendo coverage never mentions: the attach rate, which is the number of software units sold per video game console sold. Think of consoles (hardware) as the razor and the games (software) as the blades. Consoles are sold at thin margins, or sometimes, at losses, on the expectation that each console generates years of high-margin game sales. If the attach rate is falling, the entire economic model of the platform weakens, no matter how good the initial hardware sales.

The headline attach rate is already showing erosion. In its first ten months since launch, Switch 2 sold 19.86 million consoles and 48.71 million games, an attach rate of 2.45. Over the original Switch’s comparable launch window, the figure was 3.57. That’s a 31% decline, launch window versus launch window, before we adjust for anything…

User's avatar

Continue reading this post for free, courtesy of Accrued Interest (Simeon M.).

Or purchase a paid subscription.
© 2026 Simeon McMillan · Privacy ∙ Terms ∙ Collection notice
Start your SubstackGet the app
Substack is the home for great culture